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// Copyright 2015-2020 Brian Smith.
//
// Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
// purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
// copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
//
// THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHORS DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES
// WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR
// ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
// WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
// ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
// OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
use core::fmt::Write;
use pki_types::{DnsName, InvalidDnsNameError};
use super::verify::{GeneralName, NameIterator};
use crate::Error;
pub(crate) fn verify_dns_names(
reference: &DnsName<'_>,
mut names: NameIterator<'_>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let dns_name = untrusted::Input::from(reference.as_ref().as_bytes());
names
.find_map(|result| {
let name = match result {
Ok(name) => name,
Err(err) => return Some(Err(err)),
};
let presented_id = match name {
GeneralName::DnsName(presented) => presented,
_ => return None,
};
match presented_id_matches_reference_id(presented_id, IdRole::Reference, dns_name) {
Ok(true) => Some(Ok(())),
Ok(false) | Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier) => None,
Err(e) => Some(Err(e)),
}
})
.unwrap_or(Err(Error::CertNotValidForName))
}
/// A reference to a DNS Name presented by a server that may include a wildcard.
///
/// A `WildcardDnsNameRef` is guaranteed to be syntactically valid. The validity rules
/// are specified in [RFC 5280 Section 7.2], except that underscores are also
/// allowed.
///
/// Additionally, while [RFC6125 Section 4.1] says that a wildcard label may be of the form
/// `<x>*<y>.<DNSID>`, where `<x>` and/or `<y>` may be empty, we follow a stricter policy common
/// to most validation libraries (e.g. NSS) and only accept wildcard labels that are exactly `*`.
///
/// [RFC 5280 Section 7.2]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-7.2
/// [RFC 6125 Section 4.1]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6125#section-4.1
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Eq, PartialEq, Hash)]
pub(crate) struct WildcardDnsNameRef<'a>(&'a [u8]);
impl<'a> WildcardDnsNameRef<'a> {
/// Constructs a `WildcardDnsNameRef` from the given input if the input is a
/// syntactically-valid DNS name.
pub(crate) fn try_from_ascii(dns_name: &'a [u8]) -> Result<Self, InvalidDnsNameError> {
if !is_valid_dns_id(
untrusted::Input::from(dns_name),
IdRole::Reference,
Wildcards::Allow,
) {
return Err(InvalidDnsNameError);
}
Ok(Self(dns_name))
}
/// Yields a reference to the DNS name as a `&str`.
pub(crate) fn as_str(&self) -> &'a str {
// The unwrap won't fail because a `WildcardDnsNameRef` is guaranteed to be ASCII and
// ASCII is a subset of UTF-8.
core::str::from_utf8(self.0).unwrap()
}
}
impl core::fmt::Debug for WildcardDnsNameRef<'_> {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> Result<(), core::fmt::Error> {
f.write_str("WildcardDnsNameRef(\"")?;
// Convert each byte of the underlying ASCII string to a `char` and
// downcase it prior to formatting it. We avoid self.to_owned() since
// it requires allocation.
for &ch in self.0 {
f.write_char(char::from(ch).to_ascii_lowercase())?;
}
f.write_str("\")")
}
}
// We assume that both presented_dns_id and reference_dns_id are encoded in
// such a way that US-ASCII (7-bit) characters are encoded in one byte and no
// encoding of a non-US-ASCII character contains a code point in the range
// 0-127. For example, UTF-8 is OK but UTF-16 is not.
//
// RFC6125 says that a wildcard label may be of the form <x>*<y>.<DNSID>, where
// <x> and/or <y> may be empty. However, NSS requires <y> to be empty, and we
// follow NSS's stricter policy by accepting wildcards only of the form
// <x>*.<DNSID>, where <x> may be empty.
//
// An relative presented DNS ID matches both an absolute reference ID and a
// relative reference ID. Absolute presented DNS IDs are not supported:
//
// Presented ID Reference ID Result
// -------------------------------------
// example.com example.com Match
// example.com. example.com Mismatch
// example.com example.com. Match
// example.com. example.com. Mismatch
//
// There are more subtleties documented inline in the code.
//
// Name constraints ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//
// This is all RFC 5280 has to say about dNSName constraints:
//
// DNS name restrictions are expressed as host.example.com. Any DNS
// name that can be constructed by simply adding zero or more labels to
// the left-hand side of the name satisfies the name constraint. For
// example, www.host.example.com would satisfy the constraint but
// host1.example.com would not.
//
// This lack of specificity has lead to a lot of uncertainty regarding
// subdomain matching. In particular, the following questions have been
// raised and answered:
//
// Q: Does a presented identifier equal (case insensitive) to the name
// constraint match the constraint? For example, does the presented
// ID "host.example.com" match a "host.example.com" constraint?
// A: Yes. RFC5280 says "by simply adding zero or more labels" and this
// is the case of adding zero labels.
//
// Q: When the name constraint does not start with ".", do subdomain
// presented identifiers match it? For example, does the presented
// ID "www.host.example.com" match a "host.example.com" constraint?
// A: Yes. RFC5280 says "by simply adding zero or more labels" and this
// is the case of adding more than zero labels. The example is the
// one from RFC 5280.
//
// Q: When the name constraint does not start with ".", does a
// non-subdomain prefix match it? For example, does "bigfoo.bar.com"
// match "foo.bar.com"? [4]
// A: No. We interpret RFC 5280's language of "adding zero or more labels"
// to mean that whole labels must be prefixed.
//
// (Note that the above three scenarios are the same as the RFC 6265
// domain matching rules [0].)
//
// Q: Is a name constraint that starts with "." valid, and if so, what
// semantics does it have? For example, does a presented ID of
// "www.example.com" match a constraint of ".example.com"? Does a
// presented ID of "example.com" match a constraint of ".example.com"?
// A: This implementation, NSS[1], and SChannel[2] all support a
// leading ".", but OpenSSL[3] does not yet. Amongst the
// implementations that support it, a leading "." is legal and means
// the same thing as when the "." is omitted, EXCEPT that a
// presented identifier equal (case insensitive) to the name
// constraint is not matched; i.e. presented dNSName identifiers
// must be subdomains. Some CAs in Mozilla's CA program (e.g. HARICA)
// have name constraints with the leading "." in their root
// certificates. The name constraints imposed on DCISS by Mozilla also
// have the it, so supporting this is a requirement for backward
// compatibility, even if it is not yet standardized. So, for example, a
// presented ID of "www.example.com" matches a constraint of
// ".example.com" but a presented ID of "example.com" does not.
//
// Q: Is there a way to prevent subdomain matches?
// A: Yes.
//
// Some people have proposed that dNSName constraints that do not
// start with a "." should be restricted to exact (case insensitive)
// matches. However, such a change of semantics from what RFC5280
// specifies would be a non-backward-compatible change in the case of
// permittedSubtrees constraints, and it would be a security issue for
// excludedSubtrees constraints.
//
// However, it can be done with a combination of permittedSubtrees and
// excludedSubtrees, e.g. "example.com" in permittedSubtrees and
// ".example.com" in excludedSubtrees.
//
// Q: Are name constraints allowed to be specified as absolute names?
// For example, does a presented ID of "example.com" match a name
// constraint of "example.com." and vice versa.
// A: Absolute names are not supported as presented IDs or name
// constraints. Only reference IDs may be absolute.
//
// Q: Is "" a valid dNSName constraint? If so, what does it mean?
// A: Yes. Any valid presented dNSName can be formed "by simply adding zero
// or more labels to the left-hand side" of "". In particular, an
// excludedSubtrees dNSName constraint of "" forbids all dNSNames.
//
// Q: Is "." a valid dNSName constraint? If so, what does it mean?
// A: No, because absolute names are not allowed (see above).
//
// [0] RFC 6265 (Cookies) Domain Matching rules:
// http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6265#section-5.1.3
// [1] NSS source code:
// https://mxr.mozilla.org/nss/source/lib/certdb/genname.c?rev=2a7348f013cb#1209
// [2] Description of SChannel's behavior from Microsoft:
// http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/mail-archive/msg04668.html
// [3] Proposal to add such support to OpenSSL:
// http://www.mail-archive.com/openssl-dev%40openssl.org/msg36204.html
// https://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=3562
// [4] Feedback on the lack of clarify in the definition that never got
// incorporated into the spec:
// https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/pkix/current/msg21192.html
pub(super) fn presented_id_matches_reference_id(
presented_dns_id: untrusted::Input<'_>,
reference_dns_id_role: IdRole,
reference_dns_id: untrusted::Input<'_>,
) -> Result<bool, Error> {
if !is_valid_dns_id(presented_dns_id, IdRole::Presented, Wildcards::Allow) {
return Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier);
}
if !is_valid_dns_id(reference_dns_id, reference_dns_id_role, Wildcards::Deny) {
return Err(match reference_dns_id_role {
IdRole::NameConstraint => Error::MalformedNameConstraint,
_ => Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier,
});
}
let mut presented = untrusted::Reader::new(presented_dns_id);
let mut reference = untrusted::Reader::new(reference_dns_id);
match reference_dns_id_role {
IdRole::Reference => (),
IdRole::NameConstraint if presented_dns_id.len() > reference_dns_id.len() => {
if reference_dns_id.is_empty() {
// An empty constraint matches everything.
return Ok(true);
}
// If the reference ID starts with a dot then skip the prefix of
// the presented ID and start the comparison at the position of
// that dot. Examples:
//
// Matches Doesn't Match
// -----------------------------------------------------------
// original presented ID: www.example.com badexample.com
// skipped: www ba
// presented ID w/o prefix: .example.com dexample.com
// reference ID: .example.com .example.com
//
// If the reference ID does not start with a dot then we skip
// the prefix of the presented ID but also verify that the
// prefix ends with a dot. Examples:
//
// Matches Doesn't Match
// -----------------------------------------------------------
// original presented ID: www.example.com badexample.com
// skipped: www ba
// must be '.': . d
// presented ID w/o prefix: example.com example.com
// reference ID: example.com example.com
//
if reference.peek(b'.') {
if presented
.skip(presented_dns_id.len() - reference_dns_id.len())
.is_err()
{
unreachable!();
}
} else {
if presented
.skip(presented_dns_id.len() - reference_dns_id.len() - 1)
.is_err()
{
unreachable!();
}
if presented.read_byte() != Ok(b'.') {
return Ok(false);
}
}
}
IdRole::NameConstraint => (),
IdRole::Presented => unreachable!(),
}
// Only allow wildcard labels that consist only of '*'.
if presented.peek(b'*') {
if presented.skip(1).is_err() {
unreachable!();
}
loop {
if reference.read_byte().is_err() {
return Ok(false);
}
if reference.peek(b'.') {
break;
}
}
}
loop {
let presented_byte = match (presented.read_byte(), reference.read_byte()) {
(Ok(p), Ok(r)) if ascii_lower(p) == ascii_lower(r) => p,
_ => {
return Ok(false);
}
};
if presented.at_end() {
// Don't allow presented IDs to be absolute.
if presented_byte == b'.' {
return Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier);
}
break;
}
}
// Allow a relative presented DNS ID to match an absolute reference DNS ID,
// unless we're matching a name constraint.
if !reference.at_end() {
if reference_dns_id_role != IdRole::NameConstraint {
match reference.read_byte() {
Ok(b'.') => (),
_ => {
return Ok(false);
}
};
}
if !reference.at_end() {
return Ok(false);
}
}
assert!(presented.at_end());
assert!(reference.at_end());
Ok(true)
}
#[inline]
fn ascii_lower(b: u8) -> u8 {
match b {
b'A'..=b'Z' => b + b'a' - b'A',
_ => b,
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
enum Wildcards {
Deny,
Allow,
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
pub(super) enum IdRole {
Reference,
Presented,
NameConstraint,
}
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.6:
//
// When the subjectAltName extension contains a domain name system
// label, the domain name MUST be stored in the dNSName (an IA5String).
// The name MUST be in the "preferred name syntax", as specified by
// Section 3.5 of [RFC1034] and as modified by Section 2.1 of
// [RFC1123].
//
// https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1136616: As an exception to the
// requirement above, underscores are also allowed in names for compatibility.
fn is_valid_dns_id(
hostname: untrusted::Input<'_>,
id_role: IdRole,
allow_wildcards: Wildcards,
) -> bool {
// https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/oldnewthing/20120412-00/?p=7873/
if hostname.len() > 253 {
return false;
}
let mut input = untrusted::Reader::new(hostname);
if id_role == IdRole::NameConstraint && input.at_end() {
return true;
}
let mut dot_count = 0;
let mut label_length = 0;
let mut label_is_all_numeric = false;
let mut label_ends_with_hyphen = false;
// Only presented IDs are allowed to have wildcard labels. And, like
// Chromium, be stricter than RFC 6125 requires by insisting that a
// wildcard label consist only of '*'.
let is_wildcard = allow_wildcards == Wildcards::Allow && input.peek(b'*');
let mut is_first_byte = !is_wildcard;
if is_wildcard {
if input.read_byte() != Ok(b'*') || input.read_byte() != Ok(b'.') {
return false;
}
dot_count += 1;
}
loop {
const MAX_LABEL_LENGTH: usize = 63;
match input.read_byte() {
Ok(b'-') => {
if label_length == 0 {
return false; // Labels must not start with a hyphen.
}
label_is_all_numeric = false;
label_ends_with_hyphen = true;
label_length += 1;
if label_length > MAX_LABEL_LENGTH {
return false;
}
}
Ok(b'0'..=b'9') => {
if label_length == 0 {
label_is_all_numeric = true;
}
label_ends_with_hyphen = false;
label_length += 1;
if label_length > MAX_LABEL_LENGTH {
return false;
}
}
Ok(b'a'..=b'z') | Ok(b'A'..=b'Z') | Ok(b'_') => {
label_is_all_numeric = false;
label_ends_with_hyphen = false;
label_length += 1;
if label_length > MAX_LABEL_LENGTH {
return false;
}
}
Ok(b'.') => {
dot_count += 1;
if label_length == 0 && (id_role != IdRole::NameConstraint || !is_first_byte) {
return false;
}
if label_ends_with_hyphen {
return false; // Labels must not end with a hyphen.
}
label_length = 0;
}
_ => {
return false;
}
}
is_first_byte = false;
if input.at_end() {
break;
}
}
// Only reference IDs, not presented IDs or name constraints, may be
// absolute.
if label_length == 0 && id_role != IdRole::Reference {
return false;
}
if label_ends_with_hyphen {
return false; // Labels must not end with a hyphen.
}
if label_is_all_numeric {
return false; // Last label must not be all numeric.
}
if is_wildcard {
// If the DNS ID ends with a dot, the last dot signifies an absolute ID.
let label_count = if label_length == 0 {
dot_count
} else {
dot_count + 1
};
// Like NSS, require at least two labels to follow the wildcard label.
// TODO: Allow the TrustDomain to control this on a per-eTLD+1 basis,
// similar to Chromium. Even then, it might be better to still enforce
// that there are at least two labels after the wildcard.
if label_count < 3 {
return false;
}
}
true
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[allow(clippy::type_complexity)]
const PRESENTED_MATCHES_REFERENCE: &[(&[u8], &[u8], Result<bool, Error>)] = &[
(b"", b"a", Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier)),
(b"a", b"a", Ok(true)),
(b"b", b"a", Ok(false)),
(b"*.b.a", b"c.b.a", Ok(true)),
(b"*.b.a", b"b.a", Ok(false)),
(b"*.b.a", b"b.a.", Ok(false)),
// Wildcard not in leftmost label
(b"d.c.b.a", b"d.c.b.a", Ok(true)),
(b"d.*.b.a", b"d.c.b.a", Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier)),
(b"d.c*.b.a", b"d.c.b.a", Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier)),
(b"d.c*.b.a", b"d.cc.b.a", Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier)),
// case sensitivity
(
b"abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz",
b"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ",
Ok(true),
),
(
b"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ",
b"abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz",
Ok(true),
),
(b"aBc", b"Abc", Ok(true)),
// digits
(b"a1", b"a1", Ok(true)),
// A trailing dot indicates an absolute name, and absolute names can match
// relative names, and vice-versa.
(b"example", b"example", Ok(true)),
(b"example.", b"example.", Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier)),
(b"example", b"example.", Ok(true)),
(b"example.", b"example", Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier)),
(b"example.com", b"example.com", Ok(true)),
(
b"example.com.",
b"example.com.",
Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier),
),
(b"example.com", b"example.com.", Ok(true)),
(
b"example.com.",
b"example.com",
Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier),
),
(
b"example.com..",
b"example.com.",
Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier),
),
(
b"example.com..",
b"example.com",
Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier),
),
(
b"example.com...",
b"example.com.",
Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier),
),
// xn-- IDN prefix
(b"x*.b.a", b"xa.b.a", Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier)),
(b"x*.b.a", b"xna.b.a", Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier)),
(b"x*.b.a", b"xn-a.b.a", Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier)),
(b"x*.b.a", b"xn--a.b.a", Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier)),
(b"xn*.b.a", b"xn--a.b.a", Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier)),
(
b"xn-*.b.a",
b"xn--a.b.a",
Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier),
),
(
b"xn--*.b.a",
b"xn--a.b.a",
Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier),
),
(b"xn*.b.a", b"xn--a.b.a", Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier)),
(
b"xn-*.b.a",
b"xn--a.b.a",
Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier),
),
(
b"xn--*.b.a",
b"xn--a.b.a",
Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier),
),
(
b"xn---*.b.a",
b"xn--a.b.a",
Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier),
),
// "*" cannot expand to nothing.
(b"c*.b.a", b"c.b.a", Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier)),
// --------------------------------------------------------------------------
// The rest of these are test cases adapted from Chromium's
// x509_certificate_unittest.cc. The parameter order is the opposite in
// Chromium's tests. Also, they Ok tests were modified to fit into this
// framework or due to intentional differences between mozilla::pkix and
// Chromium.
(b"foo.com", b"foo.com", Ok(true)),
(b"f", b"f", Ok(true)),
(b"i", b"h", Ok(false)),
(b"*.foo.com", b"bar.foo.com", Ok(true)),
(b"*.test.fr", b"www.test.fr", Ok(true)),
(b"*.test.FR", b"wwW.tESt.fr", Ok(true)),
(b".uk", b"f.uk", Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier)),
(
b"?.bar.foo.com",
b"w.bar.foo.com",
Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier),
),
(
b"(www|ftp).foo.com",
b"www.foo.com",
Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier),
), // regex!
(
b"www.foo.com\0",
b"www.foo.com",
Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier),
),
(
b"www.foo.com\0*.foo.com",
b"www.foo.com",
Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier),
),
(b"ww.house.example", b"www.house.example", Ok(false)),
(b"www.test.org", b"test.org", Ok(false)),
(b"*.test.org", b"test.org", Ok(false)),
(b"*.org", b"test.org", Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier)),
// '*' must be the only character in the wildcard label
(
b"w*.bar.foo.com",
b"w.bar.foo.com",
Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier),
),
(
b"ww*ww.bar.foo.com",
b"www.bar.foo.com",
Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier),
),
(
b"ww*ww.bar.foo.com",
b"wwww.bar.foo.com",
Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier),
),
(
b"w*w.bar.foo.com",
b"wwww.bar.foo.com",
Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier),
),
(
b"w*w.bar.foo.c0m",
b"wwww.bar.foo.com",
Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier),
),
(
b"wa*.bar.foo.com",
b"WALLY.bar.foo.com",
Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier),
),
(
b"*Ly.bar.foo.com",
b"wally.bar.foo.com",
Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier),
),
// Chromium does URL decoding of the reference ID, but we don't, and we also
// require that the reference ID is valid, so we can't test these two.
// (b"www.foo.com", b"ww%57.foo.com", Ok(true)),
// (b"www&.foo.com", b"www%26.foo.com", Ok(true)),
(b"*.test.de", b"www.test.co.jp", Ok(false)),
(
b"*.jp",
b"www.test.co.jp",
Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier),
),
(b"www.test.co.uk", b"www.test.co.jp", Ok(false)),
(
b"www.*.co.jp",
b"www.test.co.jp",
Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier),
),
(b"www.bar.foo.com", b"www.bar.foo.com", Ok(true)),
(b"*.foo.com", b"www.bar.foo.com", Ok(false)),
(
b"*.*.foo.com",
b"www.bar.foo.com",
Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier),
),
// Our matcher requires the reference ID to be a valid DNS name, so we cannot
// test this case.
// (b"*.*.bar.foo.com", b"*..bar.foo.com", Ok(false)),
(b"www.bath.org", b"www.bath.org", Ok(true)),
// Our matcher requires the reference ID to be a valid DNS name, so we cannot
// test these cases.
// DNS_ID_MISMATCH("www.bath.org", ""),
// (b"www.bath.org", b"20.30.40.50", Ok(false)),
// (b"www.bath.org", b"66.77.88.99", Ok(false)),
// IDN tests
(
b"xn--poema-9qae5a.com.br",
b"xn--poema-9qae5a.com.br",
Ok(true),
),
(
b"*.xn--poema-9qae5a.com.br",
b"www.xn--poema-9qae5a.com.br",
Ok(true),
),
(
b"*.xn--poema-9qae5a.com.br",
b"xn--poema-9qae5a.com.br",
Ok(false),
),
(
b"xn--poema-*.com.br",
b"xn--poema-9qae5a.com.br",
Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier),
),
(
b"xn--*-9qae5a.com.br",
b"xn--poema-9qae5a.com.br",
Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier),
),
(
b"*--poema-9qae5a.com.br",
b"xn--poema-9qae5a.com.br",
Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier),
),
// The following are adapted from the examples quoted from
// http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125#section-6.4.3
// (e.g., *.example.com would match foo.example.com but
// not bar.foo.example.com or example.com).
(b"*.example.com", b"foo.example.com", Ok(true)),
(b"*.example.com", b"bar.foo.example.com", Ok(false)),
(b"*.example.com", b"example.com", Ok(false)),
(
b"baz*.example.net",
b"baz1.example.net",
Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier),
),
(
b"*baz.example.net",
b"foobaz.example.net",
Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier),
),
(
b"b*z.example.net",
b"buzz.example.net",
Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier),
),
// Wildcards should not be valid for public registry controlled domains,
// and unknown/unrecognized domains, at least three domain components must
// be present. For mozilla::pkix and NSS, there must always be at least two
// labels after the wildcard label.
(b"*.test.example", b"www.test.example", Ok(true)),
(b"*.example.co.uk", b"test.example.co.uk", Ok(true)),
(
b"*.example",
b"test.example",
Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier),
),
// The result is different than Chromium, because Chromium takes into account
// the additional knowledge it has that "co.uk" is a TLD. mozilla::pkix does
// not know that.
(b"*.co.uk", b"example.co.uk", Ok(true)),
(b"*.com", b"foo.com", Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier)),
(b"*.us", b"foo.us", Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier)),
(b"*", b"foo", Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier)),
// IDN variants of wildcards and registry controlled domains.
(
b"*.xn--poema-9qae5a.com.br",
b"www.xn--poema-9qae5a.com.br",
Ok(true),
),
(
b"*.example.xn--mgbaam7a8h",
b"test.example.xn--mgbaam7a8h",
Ok(true),
),
// RFC6126 allows this, and NSS accepts it, but Chromium disallows it.
// TODO: File bug against Chromium.
(b"*.com.br", b"xn--poema-9qae5a.com.br", Ok(true)),
(
b"*.xn--mgbaam7a8h",
b"example.xn--mgbaam7a8h",
Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier),
),
// Wildcards should be permissible for 'private' registry-controlled
// domains. (In mozilla::pkix, we do not know if it is a private registry-
// controlled domain or not.)
(b"*.appspot.com", b"www.appspot.com", Ok(true)),
(b"*.s3.amazonaws.com", b"foo.s3.amazonaws.com", Ok(true)),
// Multiple wildcards are not valid.
(
b"*.*.com",
b"foo.example.com",
Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier),
),
(
b"*.bar.*.com",
b"foo.bar.example.com",
Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier),
),
// Absolute vs relative DNS name tests. Although not explicitly specified
// in RFC 6125, absolute reference names (those ending in a .) should
// match either absolute or relative presented names.
// TODO: File errata against RFC 6125 about this.
(b"foo.com.", b"foo.com", Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier)),
(b"foo.com", b"foo.com.", Ok(true)),
(b"foo.com.", b"foo.com.", Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier)),
(b"f.", b"f", Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier)),
(b"f", b"f.", Ok(true)),
(b"f.", b"f.", Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier)),
(
b"*.bar.foo.com.",
b"www-3.bar.foo.com",
Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier),
),
(b"*.bar.foo.com", b"www-3.bar.foo.com.", Ok(true)),
(
b"*.bar.foo.com.",
b"www-3.bar.foo.com.",
Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier),
),
// We require the reference ID to be a valid DNS name, so we cannot test this
// case.
// (b".", b".", Ok(false)),
(
b"*.com.",
b"example.com",
Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier),
),
(
b"*.com",
b"example.com.",
Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier),
),
(
b"*.com.",
b"example.com.",
Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier),
),
(b"*.", b"foo.", Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier)),
(b"*.", b"foo", Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier)),
// The result is different than Chromium because we don't know that co.uk is
// a TLD.
(
b"*.co.uk.",
b"foo.co.uk",
Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier),
),
(
b"*.co.uk.",
b"foo.co.uk.",
Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier),
),
];
#[test]
fn presented_matches_reference_test() {
for &(presented, reference, expected_result) in PRESENTED_MATCHES_REFERENCE {
let actual_result = presented_id_matches_reference_id(
untrusted::Input::from(presented),
IdRole::Reference,
untrusted::Input::from(reference),
);
assert_eq!(
actual_result, expected_result,
"presented_id_matches_reference_id(\"{:?}\", \"{:?}\")",
presented, reference
);
}
}
// (presented_name, constraint, expected_matches)
#[allow(clippy::type_complexity)]
const PRESENTED_MATCHES_CONSTRAINT: &[(&[u8], &[u8], Result<bool, Error>)] = &[
// No absolute presented IDs allowed
(b".", b"", Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier)),
(b"www.example.com.", b"", Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier)),
(
b"www.example.com.",
b"www.example.com.",
Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier),
),
// No absolute constraints allowed
(
b"www.example.com",
b".",
Err(Error::MalformedNameConstraint),
),
(
b"www.example.com",
b"www.example.com.",
Err(Error::MalformedNameConstraint),
),
// No wildcard in constraints allowed
(
b"www.example.com",
b"*.example.com",
Err(Error::MalformedNameConstraint),
),
// No empty presented IDs allowed
(b"", b"", Err(Error::MalformedDnsIdentifier)),
// Empty constraints match everything allowed
(b"example.com", b"", Ok(true)),
(b"*.example.com", b"", Ok(true)),
// Constraints that start with a dot
(b"www.example.com", b".example.com", Ok(true)),
(b"www.example.com", b".EXAMPLE.COM", Ok(true)),
(b"www.example.com", b".axample.com", Ok(false)),
(b"www.example.com", b".xample.com", Ok(false)),
(b"www.example.com", b".exampl.com", Ok(false)),
(b"badexample.com", b".example.com", Ok(false)),
// Constraints that do not start with a dot
(b"www.example.com", b"example.com", Ok(true)),
(b"www.example.com", b"EXAMPLE.COM", Ok(true)),
(b"www.example.com", b"axample.com", Ok(false)),
(b"www.example.com", b"xample.com", Ok(false)),
(b"www.example.com", b"exampl.com", Ok(false)),
(b"badexample.com", b"example.com", Ok(false)),
// Presented IDs with wildcard
(b"*.example.com", b".example.com", Ok(true)),
(b"*.example.com", b"example.com", Ok(true)),
(b"*.example.com", b"www.example.com", Ok(true)),
(b"*.example.com", b"www.EXAMPLE.COM", Ok(true)),
(b"*.example.com", b"www.axample.com", Ok(false)),
(b"*.example.com", b".xample.com", Ok(false)),
(b"*.example.com", b"xample.com", Ok(false)),
(b"*.example.com", b".exampl.com", Ok(false)),
(b"*.example.com", b"exampl.com", Ok(false)),
// Matching IDs
(b"www.example.com", b"www.example.com", Ok(true)),
];
#[test]
fn presented_matches_constraint_test() {
for &(presented, constraint, expected_result) in PRESENTED_MATCHES_CONSTRAINT {
let actual_result = presented_id_matches_reference_id(
untrusted::Input::from(presented),
IdRole::NameConstraint,
untrusted::Input::from(constraint),
);
assert_eq!(
actual_result, expected_result,
"presented_id_matches_constraint(\"{:?}\", \"{:?}\")",
presented, constraint,
);
}
}
}